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ABSTRACT
The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
requires many websites to ask for consent to the use of cookies for
specific purposes. This enlarges the design space for consent dialogs.
Websites could try to maximize click-through rates and consented
purposes, even at the risk of users agreeing to more than intended.
We evaluate a practice observed on popular websites by conducting
an experiment with one control and two treatment groups (N =
150 university students in two countries). We hypothesize that
users’ consent decision is influenced by (1) the number of options,
connecting to the theory of choice proliferation, and (2) the presence
of a highlighted default button (“select all”), connecting to theories
of social norms and deception in consumer research. The results
show that participants who see a default button accept cookies
for more purposes than the control group, while being less able to
correctly recall their choice. After being reminded of their choice,
they regret it more often and perceive the consent dialog as more
deceptive than the control group. Whether users are presented one
or three purposes has no significant effect on their decisions and
perceptions. We discuss the results and outline policy implications.
KEYWORDS
usable privacy technologies, web privacy, controlled experiment,
consent, deception, choice proliferation, GDPR
1 INTRODUCTION
The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
came into force in May 2018. It contains provisions that data con-
trollers (e. g., website operators) must have a legal basis for the
collection and processing of personal data. One legal basis is con-
sent: data subjects (users) agree to the data processing for specific
purposes. While these requirements are not new,1 the GDPR’s threat
of sanctions and effective enforcement led many website operators
to rethink their cookie practices, or at least ensure compliance by
obtaining consent before using cookies for purposes that are not
covered by other legal bases [52]. Web cookies are key–value pairs
stored on the client device for purposes ranging from session track-
ing, user recognition, counting unique users, third-party tracking
to profiling and targeted advertising [18].
A common method for asking web users to decide on the cookie
settings is a pop-up banner that appears at the beginning of each
users’ first visit of a website. The banner typically includes a notice
on the data collection and asks users whether they agree to (parts
1The principles of consent and purpose binding appear in data protection laws since
the 1970s. The specific case for web cookies was harmonized in the EU through the
ePrivacy Directive in 2002 [32, 39], but respected by only one in twowebsites, according
to a recent measurement study [50].
of) the practices. A recent study finds that 62% of the websites ana-
lyzed used such banners in June 2018 [15]. The study also shows
that the implementation—specifically, the granularity of control of-
fered to users—differs between common banner types. The authors
conjecture that many cookie banners are not very usable because
the choice mechanisms are often inefficient or confusing.
Independently, in November 2018, we noticed that some cookie
banners contain consent dialogs that seem to be designed to nudge
users to accept all displayed purposes. It is understandable that
the industry finds cookie banners disadvantageous as they add
friction to the user experience and might limit the ability to track
users on and across sites. Hence, there is ample business interest
in minimizing friction and maximizing positive consent decisions
by optimizing interface design. Common design elements in the
banners we observed (see Figure 1 for exemplary screenshots) are
checkboxes for several purposes of data processing as well as but-
tons to either select all purposes at once or to confirm the manual
selection before accessing the website.
We identify two components that might compromise usability.
First, the highlighted button automatically accepts all purposes,
regardless of whether any checkboxes have (not) been selected
before the button is clicked. This button does not increase the user’s
choice options, but might rather “trick” him or her into accepting
all cookies without actively selecting them. Second, the number of
selectable purposes may influence users’ choice as former studies in
the field of psychology revealed that a high number of alternatives
has adverse effects on individuals’ decision making [14, 27]. This
phenomenon has also been demonstrated in the context of privacy
settings [29].
These considerations call for a user study, which we have carried
out in the form or a controlled classroom experiment and report in
this paper. Our general research question is:
How do users react to design features of multi-purpose consent dialogs
on the web in terms of actual behavior and stated perceptions?
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. First, we review lit-
erature on consent dialog designs in Section 2. Section 3 recalls the
theoretical background on choice proliferation and deception, from
which we derive our hypotheses. The instrument and the adminis-
tration of the controlled experiment is described in Section 4. The
results of our hypothesis tests (Section 5) precede the discussion of
our findings (Section 6). We conclude with some recommendations
for interface design and policy development in Section 7.
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Figure 1: Examples of real-world consent dialogs in the
cookie banners that motivated this study: a US technology
news website (top) and a German airline website (bottom).
2 BACKGROUND
We first summarize the legal requirements for GDPR-compliant
consent dialogs in Section 2.1, before we review the literature on
engineering solutions for specifying privacy preferences (with em-
phasis on the purpose) in Section 2.2.
2.1 Legal Requirements for Consent Dialogs
Article 7 of the GDPR describes the requirements of legitimate
consent: it needs to be (1) freely given, (2) unambiguous, (3) in-
formed, and (4) withdrawable at any time [40]. In the event of a
dispute, the data controller must prove that the subject has truly
given consent to the processing practices [12]. Specifically, consent
must be communicated “by a statement” or a “clear affirmative ac-
tion” [40]. Regarding the clearness of this action, ticking a checkbox
on a website is considered an acceptable form, while passiveness
or predefined default settings that are not actively declined by the
subject do not constitute clear consent [12].
If personal data is collected for more than one purpose, data
subjects need to be informed and provided with distinct opt-in
choices for every purpose [40]. Besides these rough guidelines, the
GDPR’s purpose-binding does not specify any design template and
thus leaves the exploration of the design space for consent dialogs
to market participants.
For the specific case of web cookies, the market has adopted a
rough classification of purposes into strictly necessary (which pre-
sumably does not require consent), preferences, statistics, and mar-
keting (which includes third-party tracking) [e. g. 3, 15, Fig. 4 (d)].
This mirrors the approach taken in a user survey by Ackerman et
al. as early as in 1999 [1]. The authors distinguish between cookies
for “customized service”, “customized advertising”, and “customized
advertising across many websites”. They report a decreasing will-
ingness to agree, from 96% to 77% for users classified as “marginally
concerned” about privacy, and from 43% to 14% for so-called “pri-
vacy fundamentalists” in a sample of 381 US internet users (Fig. 3
of [1]). While the former classification is implemented in popular
content management systems, it is by no means the only way of
defining purposes. As a result, website operators who can afford
specialized lawyers enjoy more freedom in the design of consent
dialogs. Others follow common practices in order to minimize legal
uncertainty, or to comply with the terms of services of third parties
who provide content or code to embed (e. g., Google Analytics).
The bulk of the burden last on privacy-aware users, who have to
understand and navigate each site’s specific model.
2.2 Technical Solutions for Seeking Consent
Researchers have studied ways to effectively inform users about
privacy policies and seek their consent to data processing long
before the GDPR. For example, a CHI paper from 2001 provides
design recommendations for cookie consent dialogs after evaluating
design changes of the then popular browsers over time [35]. The
authors criticize that in some browsers, users had to invest great
effort when searching for an alternative to the “accept all cookies”
default setting. Consent dialogs are specific forms of privacy notices,
a topic so profoundly researched that Schaub et al. [44] saw the
need to systematize the literature. According to their proposed
taxonomy, the design space can be divided along the dimensions
timing, channel, modality, and control [44]. In the following, we use
this terminology when applicable.
Bergmann [4] addresses the problem of complex and incompre-
hensible privacy choices. The author suggests a design for generic
predefined privacy settings (timing: at setup) that are summarized
in a limited number of categories. He defines four privacy profiles
that differ in the acceptance level of transmission and processing of
personal data. The suggested solution aims at decreasing the user’s
cognitive effort when selecting suitable privacy settings, but we
are not aware of any empirical study to evaluate this approach.
Pettersson et al. [42] discuss a similar design with predefined set-
tings. They suggest the adoption of a privacy management system
that asks users for consent before transmitting their personal data
(timing: at setup). Moreover, users’ acceptance of data processing
practices can be configured in advance and apply to future web-
site visits. However, the authors point out that designing consent
forms that are applicable to a large number of different websites
is a complex task. It might require compromises on usability as
many different settings need to be offered by the system. More
specifically, Pettersson et al. [41] propose design paradigms that
include suggestions for consent dialogs. Incorporating recommen-
dations by data protection commissioners and legal experts as well
as standards established in the PISA project [9], the authors present
a dialog window with several mandatory and optional fields, an
expandable privacy notice, information about the data recipients,
and an “I agree” button. They also propose methods to overcome
habituation by, for instance, implementing drag-and-drop actions
for giving consent. The authors qualitatively evaluate the results of
their usability tests and find that some users did not fully trust the
privacy management system.
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In a follow-up study, Bergman [5] empirically explores how
to successfully communicate websites’ privacy policies to users.
Specifically, he compared a conventional interface for online forms
to an extended version with additional explanations of privacy
information that pops up (timing: just-in-time) while filling the form
(so-called “privacy bars”). The author finds that participants who
saw the extended version were significantly more likely to be aware
of the policy than the control group. But he did not measure the cost
of this sophistication in terms of response time or reduced usability.
Moreover, looking at the screenshots of the extended dialog (Fig. 2
of [5]) lets us wonder whether there is a risk of information overload.
Finally, as the dialog was only tested on desktop computers, it
remains unclear how this information can be perceived on small
mobile displays.
Tiny displays raise the need for non-interactive forms of privacy
preference negotiations. An established (but meanwhile discontin-
ued) standard for expressing privacy preferences on the web is P3P.
The standard lets websites communicate their privacy policies in
machine-readable XML format (modality: machine-readable). Each
XML element represents a component, such as the type of data,
the purpose for data collection, and third party recipients [13]. A
language called Appel has been developed for enabling users to
express their privacy preference through predefined rules (timing:
at setup), so that automated privacy decisions can be based on the
user’s specific settings [31]. Since P3P focuses on the technical
transparency of information practices, researchers have criticized
the standard’s lack of clear communication to end-users [13].
A recent approach towards facilitating informed and GDPR-
compliant user consent is proposed by Ulbricht and Pallas [51]. The
authors present a privacy preference language, called YaPPL, that
is targeted on consent for data practices on the Internet of Things
(IoT). For the development, they analyze legal requirements for
consent and transform them to technical standards that suit IoT
devices (modality: machine-readable, channel: primary or secondary).
The language is prototypically tested in real-world IoT applications.
The authors hope that the underlying approach of YaPPL will also
be implemented in IoT applications that do not have to meet the
standards of GDPR, but require a technical representation of users’
privacy preferences.
Dissatisfied by the observation that many users tend to ignore
notices with privacy impact [23, 53] and have been habituated to
“click away” consent dialogs [8], several researchers investigated
how to design more effective privacy notices. For instance, Felt
et al. [19] propose design guidelines that aid mobile application
developers in appropriately asking for permissions. They find that
more than half of all permission requests can be automated while
16% require consent dialogs. By minimizing the number of runtime
consent dialogs, the authors intend to decrease the required user
attention. While technical permissions differ from legal purposes
in several respects, it is conceivable that the results also apply to
purposes, but we are unaware of relevant research in this direction.
The works on consent dialogs discussed so far are selected pieces
of the literature. They are representative in that the field focuses
on technical and human aspects in many facets, but (with a few
exceptions) it largely ignores economic interests [47]. In practice,
we must expect that businesses use the flexibility in the design of
consent dialogs for their own interest bymaximizing data disclosure
instead of helping users to make privacy-conscious decisions.
3 THEORY
User studies integrate better into the body of knowledge (and, ar-
guably, generalize better), if the hypothesized causal links are de-
rived from established theory. Therefore, we revisit relevant theo-
ries for explaining the effect of the two characteristic components
in the consent dialogs inspiring this work (Fig. 1). Specifically, we
review choice proliferation in Section 3.1 to reason about the num-
ber of purposes, and social norms in combination with deception
in Section 3.2 to predict the effect of the default button. Then, we
formulate our hypotheses in Section 3.3.
3.1 Choice Proliferation
Choice proliferation is a line of research in psychology that analyzes
the influence of an increasing number of alternative choices on
the human decision-making process. The phenomenon that more
options result in negative effects, such as dissatisfaction, has mainly
been studied in a marketing context [25, 45] and is often referred
to as “too much choice”, “tyranny of choice”, or “choice overload”.
As pointed out by Johnson et al. [25], two main aspects have to
be considered when evaluating the number of choices offered. On
the one hand, a high number of alternatives increases the cognitive
load while causing individuals to feel stressed, overwhelmed, and
more likely to regret one’s decision [14, 27]. On the other hand,
the likelihood that the choice suits the individual’s preferences in-
creases when more options are given. Thus, the practical challenge
is to find the right balance.
In the context of privacy, a few works investigate the effect of
increasing privacy choices on users’ decision making. Korff and
Böhme [29] experimentally study the influence of choice amount
and choice structure in the context of privacy preferences on a
business networking website. They find that participants who were
confronted with a larger number of privacy settings to chose from
were less satisfied with their choice and experienced more regret.
The works by Knijnenburg et al. [28] and Tang et al. [49] investigate
the number of privacy choices in the context of mobile location
sharing. Both studies find that the structure of presented choices
significantly impacts users’ tendency to disclose personal data. Kras-
nova et al. discuss the effect of an increasing amount of information
items in mobile applications’ permission requests [30]. The results
of their experiment show that users tend to be more concerned if
the permission request asks for more information items. This aspect
of choice proliferation seems to be specific to privacy, because op-
tions in privacy dialogs often remind users of threats. This is rarely
the case in the marketing literature on choice proliferation, where
the typical study varies the number of form of a retail product.
Broadly related to the number of options is the number of occa-
sions for privacy decisions. Böhme and Grossklags [7] discuss the
averse effects of escalating too many privacy (and security) deci-
sions to the end-user. They postulate that only the most important
decisions should be made by users, so that they do not get habit-
uated to ignore notices as a consequence of too high complexity.
Several empirical studies support this interpretation. For example,
Egelman [17] attributes the null result in an experiment on more or
3
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less verbose variants of the well-known consent dialog of Facebook
Connect to habituated ignorance.
Our study connects to the literature on choice proliferation by ex-
perimentally varying the number of purposes. We adapt established
constructs to measure perceived task difficulty and regret.
3.2 Deception and Social Norms
The concept of deception is often described as being misled due
to unfair practices and can occur in many contexts when inter-
ests of different parties collide [26]. Deception has been studied
in several areas such as marketing [11, 36, 43, 55] and organiza-
tional research [20, 24, 56]. A deceptive practice is being conducted
if the targeted individual receives false information that lead to
false impressions of a situation. Such false impressions may trigger
decisions or opinions that would have been formed in a different
way without the deceiving act.
However, deception is not always based on lying, as it may also
comprise purposeful evocation of specific actions by the targeted
party; for instance, by increasing the complexity of information,
or by making use of behavioral clues or clue patterns. A study
by Nochenson and Grossklags [36] investigates how users of web
shops are tricked into falling for post-marketing strategies due to
specific design elements in notices. In an experimental setup, they
test the purchasing behavior of more than 500 users and find that
above 40% unintentionally signed up for an extra service for an
additional fee. The authors find that opt-in and opt-out default
buttons significantly impact the users’ tendency to fall for the trick.
In privacy research, deception has been studied in the context
of strategies used by malicious parties. Bösch et al. [10] present a
conceptualization of strategies, so-called “dark patterns,” that are
commonly adopted to invade privacy. The authors explain that
users fall for these strategies because of their habits and thinking
processes. For instance, users typically do not read privacy notices
completely [33] and often intuitively agree to the presented condi-
tions. This behavior can be exploited by hiding undesirable terms
in privacy notices.
Citing usability guidelines [46], Böhme and Köpsell [8] underline
that the default option should include the most frequently selected
settings so that inexperienced users can be assisted by the decision
of the majority. In this sense, default buttons can be interpreted
as a descriptive social norm. However, as highlighted in a study
on default privacy settings on social media websites, the preset or
default options are often very disclosing and do not seem to reflect
the majority of users’ actual privacy preferences [54]. Over the
years, it seems that the default button has mutated from a usability
tool that improves efficiency when selecting the typical choice to a
strategic tool that supports the interests of the system designer.
In the spirit of the GDPR, one could argue that tactics involving
increased complexity, hidden information, or unwanted default
settings—if effective—violate the requirements for clear and in-
formed consent. Our study adds empirical evidence on the effective-
ness of these tactics in the specific context. We vary the presence of
a “dark” default button and measure perceived deception, unlike the
wealth of studies that quantify the outcome bias caused by benign
default buttons.2 Since deceptive practices in the privacy context
are often based on increasing cognitive load, we devise a combined
experiment with choice proliferation. This allows us to interpret
perceived difficulty and response time—both proxies for cognitive
load—in relation to perceived deception.
3.3 Hypotheses
Against the backdrop of our observations of features in consent
dialogs used by popular websites and the underlying theoretical
considerations, we postulate four hypotheses:
H1 If consent dialogs include a highlighted default button that
selects all purposes, users consent to more purposes.
H2 If consent dialogs include a highlighted default button that
selects all purposes, users
(a) more often regret their decision, and
(b) perceive the website as more deceptive
after being informed about the purposes they agreed to.
H3 If consent dialogs present multiple purposes, users require
more effort as indicated by longer time to respond.
H4 If consent dialogs include multiple purposes, users perceive
the task as more difficult.
4 METHOD
To test the proposed hypotheses, we conducted a controlled experi-
ment. We describe the instrument in Section 4.1, then report from
our pretests (Section 4.2) and the survey administration (Section 4.3).
Ethical considerations are discussed in Section 4.4. Descriptive sta-
tistics are presented in Section 4.5.
4.1 Instrument
The survey instrument has two main components: a functional
mock-up website offering flight search, and an exit questionnaire.
As experimental factor, themock-up randomly presents the user one
of the three consent dialogs depicted in Figure 2. When categorizing
these dialogs along the dimensions proposed by Schaub et al. [44],
they constitute privacy notices which appear at setup (timing), in
the primary channel, as visual pop-ups (modality) that include a
blocking control.
The treatment of the first group is a deceptive dialog, which
closely resembled the banner we saw on the German airline web-
site (cf. Figure 7). It contains an explanation text about different
cookie settings, three selectable purposes with checkboxes, an ex-
pandable part providing more details about the categories, and
two buttons. The first button with the text “Select all and confirm”
stands out due to its yellow color. The second button is colorless
and says “Confirm selection” in gray font. If the yellow button is
clicked, the user (theoretically) agrees to all three cookie categories,
regardless of which boxes are checked. In contrast, a click on the
second button only confirms the settings that have actively been
selected by the user. The second treatment differs in the reduction
of selectable categories. Specifically, it only includes the “personal-
ization” purpose. Arguable, this consent dialog appears somewhat
artificial, but it was the best way we could think of reducing the
number of choices without changing the banner type to a yes/no
2The default effect is in the order of 5 %-pts. for a consent dialog where about one of
two participants agrees [8].
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question. We could not spot any indication that users perceived
this dialog as odd in the responses to an open-ended question in
the exit survey.
In contrast to the two treatments, the control group did not see
a highlighted default button. The control dialog offers the same
three purposes as observed in reality. We refrained from presenting
a version with one purpose and no default button for the lack of
hypotheses on potential interaction effects, and to increase the num-
ber of subjects in the interesting three groups. Therefore, our study
technically combines two 1 × 2 experiments with one overlapping
group rather than realizing a complete 2 × 2 design.
We copied the three purposes (statistics, comfort, personaliza-
tion) from the airline website in verbatim in order to maximize
external validity, noting that they differ from the convention dis-
cussed in Section 2.2. Users could learn more about the purposes
by clicking on a small roll-down button labelled “show details” (see
screenshot in Fig. 11 in the Appendix). Accordingly, comfort cor-
responds to prefereces, and personalization to marketing, however
without an indication whether this includes third-party tracking.
The actual flight search website has a simplistic design and only
contains text fields and date selectors for the search input. To in-
crease realism, some “special offers” for specific destinations are
depicted next to a photo of the respective city. These measures were
intended to draw the focus away from the cookie banner. The par-
ticipants’ interaction on the website is captured and continuously
transmitted to our server. This allows us to analyze response time,
click trajectories, and possible dropouts post-hoc.
Wemeasure the participants’ perceptions of thewebsite in an exit
questionnaire. At first, participants are asked to freely list positive
and negative aspects of the website. Thereafter, they should recall
their chosen cookie settings in the banner; first in free-text form
and then with specified options. Besides general questions on the
cookie dialog, four established constructs are measured through
multi-item scales. Such scales are common in psychometrics to
attenuate the measurement error of individual items. All construct
items are reported in Table 1. Answers were collected on 5-point
rating scales with semantic anchors “strongly disagree” (1) and
“strongly agree” (5). Perceived deception (PDE) is assessed using
three (of originally four) items by RomÃąn [43], adapted to the
context of our study. Additionally, we measure perceived difficulty
(PDI), privacy attitudes (PA), and regret (RE). RE is measured twice
in the questionnaire: before and after reminding the participants of
their effective cookies settings.
4.2 Pretests
Two pretests were conducted in order to assess the clarity of the
instructions and survey questions. First, we carried out two one-on-
one tests using verbal probing and think aloud techniques. Specif-
ically, test subjects were asked to express their thought process
and potential obstacles while going through the survey. Since we
found that it is confusing to first open a link with a cookie banner,
and then receive the flight search task, we decided to rearrange the
instructions. This way, the participants are even more focused on
flights than on cookies before visiting the website.
Table 1: Constructs and corresponding items.
Item Item text (translated from German)
Perceived Deception (PDE)
PDE1 When it comes to cookie settings, the website is
dishonest towards its users.
PDE2 The website tries to mislead users towards select-
ing cookie settings which they do not intend to
select.
PDE3 The website makes use of misleading tactics so
that users select cookie settings which they do not
intend to select.
Perceived Difficulty (PDI)
PDI1 It was incomprehensible to select cookie settings.
PDI2 It was frustrating to select cookie settings.
PDI3↔ It was easy to select cookie settings.
Regret (RE)
RE1 I regret my choice of cookie settings.
RE2 I would change my cookie settings if it was possi-
ble.
RE3↔ I am satisfied with my choice of cookie settings.
Privacy Attitudes (PA)
PA1 It is important for me to protect my privacy online.
PA2 If websites use cookies, my online privacy is im-
paired.
PA3 I am concerned about my online privacy being
impaired by website cookies.
The scales of items marked with ‘↔’ were reversed for the analysis.
In order to simulate the actual survey environment in a lecture
hall, the second pretest was conducted with 20 Austrian under-
graduate students in a computer lab. This way, we were able to
estimate the required time for each survey step. During the test,
we observed that several test subjects glanced at their neighbors’
screens and talked to one another while completing the survey. As
this behavior might reduce the data quality, we added the appeal
to work quietly and by oneself to the instructions. Additionally,
technical adjustments were made that concerned the collection of
timestamps.
4.3 Survey Administration
The data collection took place on two days in January 2019 at an
Austrian and a German university. All parts of the instrument and
the written and spoken instructions were provided in the local
language (German). We report the original wording of scale items
and selected screenshots in the appendix (Section 8) to facilitate
error analysis and possible replication studies. The survey was ad-
ministered at the beginning of lectures attended by undergraduate
computer science students, mainly in the first year. Figure 3 sum-
marizes the steps of the data collection, along with the order of the
measured constructs.
During the briefing, we informed the participants that their data
will be held confidential and cannot be linked to their identity. We
also pointed out the voluntary nature of participating in the study
5
Machuletz and Böhme
Deception (T1) Reduced choice (T2) Control
Figure 2: Variations of consent dialogs shown in the cookie banner. The study participants saw German versions.
Briefing Visit flight
search website
Consent dialog version
(T1, T2, or control)
Explanation of participant’s
chosen cookie settings
Choice of cookie settings
General
perception
of website
Recall chosen
cookie
settings
Construct
items:
PDI, RE1
Construct
items: RE2,
PDE, PA
Questionnaire
Construct measurements, perceptions, etc.
Debriefing| |

Figure 3: Visualization of study process with treatments (dotted boxes) and measurements (dashed boxes). Arrows marked
with a semaphore represent that all participants in the classroom proceed with the next step synchronously.
and asked them to conscientiously follow the instructions without
interacting with one another. We communicated that the scope of
the study is about the user experience of flight search websites,
without mentioning the focus on cookie banners or privacy.
In the second step, participants were given the task to search
for a flight with a specific departure, destination, and time. Then,
we provided the link to the flight search website that is described
above. When visiting the link, one of the three cookie banners
depicted in Figure 2 was randomly assigned to each participant.
After reacting to the banner and entering the flight search, a modal
window appeared, which asked to wait for further instructions.
When the vast majority had reached this step, a key combina-
tion for opening the questionnaire was displayed on the lecture
hall’s main projector. This way, participants started answering the
questions almost simultaneously. On average, it took them 6’ 34”
to complete the questionnaire while 90% were finished after 9’ 06”.
In the debriefing, we informed the participants about the topic
of the study and showed them screenshots of cookie banners used
by real websites. We ran the classroom experiment exactly once
at each university, one in Austria and one in Germany, thereby
minimizing the likelihood that earlier participants could tell later
participants the true purpose of the study.
4.4 Research Ethics
In fulfillment of approved ethical standards, we clearly communi-
cated that participation is voluntary and anonymous. Respondents
could skip questions they did not want to answer. The search task
itself and the surrounding stimulus material was chosen to not raise
emotions or strong feelings. Independent of the participants’ se-
lected cookie settings, we did not store cookies and only transmitted
data to our servers that are relevant for the research purpose.
In not revealing the true purpose of our study right away, we
applied deception ourselves as part of the research method. This
is common practice and was in accordance with the ethical over-
sight bodies at all universities involved. The practice is deemed
acceptable in particular because of the low probability of causing
harm and the fact that we revealed the purpose of our study in the
debriefing, where we also provided contact information and offered
the communication of results.
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4.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of our sample. In total, 164
students took part in the study whereof 158 completed the survey.
We deleted 8 records due to more than four missing responses
on critical construct items. The remaining 13 records with missing
answers contained a total of 20 missing values, which were replaced
by the mean of the observed item score. Consequently, the analysis
uses 150 valid cases. As a consequence of the convenience sample,
the ratio of female participants was below 20%, which is typical for
German-speaking computer science undergraduates.
Even though we asked participants to use their laptops for com-
pleting the survey, we allowed those without one to chose another
device they had at hand. While 42.7% followed the survey instruc-
tions on a screen width below 500 pixels (i. e., likely smartphones),
52.7% had a screen width above 1000 pixels (i. e., likely notebooks).
Most participants opened the website on Chrome (54.0%); others
used Safari (19.3%) or Firefox (20.0%). We did not observe notewor-
thy differences in results between device types or browsers and
thus refrain from reporting breakdowns in the following analyses.
By asking whether participants know what browser cookies
are, we find that 68.0% are able to provide a correct explanation.
Only 12.7% claim to know what cookies are, but provided either no
explanation or an incorrect one. The remaining 19.3% stated that
they have no knowledge about cookies.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics.
Item Number Fraction
All 150 100.0%
Group
T1 50 33.3%
T2 48 32.0%
Control 52 34.7%
Location of the university
Austria 90 60.0%
Germany 60 40.0%
Screen width
<500px 64 42.7%
500px–1000px 7 4.7%
>1000px 79 52.7%
Browser
Chrome 81 54.0%
Firefox 30 20.0%
Safari 29 19.3%
Other 10 6.7%
Knowledge about cookies
Self-reported knowledge 121 80.7%
Correctly described cookies 102 68.0%
Privacy measures (self-report)
Regularly deletes cookies 64 42.7%
Has cookies disabled 36 24.0%
Uses ad-blocker 113 75.3%
Uses anti-virus software 80 53.3%
Table 3: Construct reliability.
Construct Cronbach’s α Mean Median SD
PDE 0.79 3.52 3.67 1.13
PDI 0.73 2.82 2.67 1.17
RE-before 0.83 2.39 2.33 1.14
RE-after 0.74 2.62 2.33 1.20
PA 0.80 3.61 3.67 0.91
Each construct has 3 items.
On average, it took participants 11.8 seconds to respond to the
cookie banner. Only 8.7% expanded the banner by clicking on “Show
details”, and 3.3% edited their initial choice by unselecting at least
one purpose. In total, 41.3% did not agree to any cookie purpose,
while 30.7% accepted all purposes offered. Of all participants in the
two treatment groups (n = 98), 56.1% clicked on the default button,
which results in accepting all purposes regardless of which purposes
were actively selected. Of these participants, 34.5% (n = 19) still
selected at least one purpose.
To evaluate the construct reliability of PDE, PDI, RE und PA,
we examine internal consistency by calculating Cronbach’s α . As
shown in Table 3, each constructs’ Cronbach’s α value lies above
0.7, indicating that they are sufficiently consistent [6] and thus
suitable for further analysis.
5 RESULTS
We begin with the deductive hypothesis tests, before we investigate
additional aspects in a quantitative explorative way (Section 5.2).
5.1 Hypothesis Tests
We test H1 by analyzing whether the deception group and the
control group differ in the number of purposes they effectively
agreed to. To do so, we assign a score from 0 (no purposes, by
clicking on “Confirm selection” without checking any box) to 3
(all purposes by either checking all boxes and then clicking any
button, or by clicking the highlighted default button). Participants
who were confronted with the deceptive banner effectively agreed
to more purposes. Table 4 presents the score values by treatment
and control group. Since the score is a count variable, we use the
Kruskal–Wallis (KW) test, which indicates as strongly significant
effect (χ2(1) = 7.2, p < 0.01) in the hypothesized direction. This
supports H1. The effect of the deceptive default button on agree-
ing to no or all purposes is in the order of 20 %-pts., about four
times larger than the plain default effect reported for an application
consent dialog in [8]. We additionally check if participants in the
deception group are more likely to agree to all three instead of
two or less purposes by applying a Chi-squared test (χ2(1) = 9.05,
p < 0.005). Again, the test reveals a highly significant difference.
To test H2a, we compare the measurements of regret before
(RE-before) and after (RE-after) participants got informed about
the purposes they effectively agreed to. Results of the paired t-
test reveal a significant difference between the before/after states
for the deception group (t(49) = 3.07, p < 0.01, d = 0.40). This
supports H2a. The difference in the control group is not significant
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(t(51) = 1.63, p = 0.11, d = 0.23). Thus, we can attribute the regret
to the misinformation caused by the deceptive design.
When analyzing perceived deception (PDE) for testing H2b, a
notable difference between groups can be found (Figure 4). The
t-test shows that PDE of the deception group is significantly higher
than of the control group (t(96.8279) = 2.24, p < 0.05, d = 0.44).
Therefore, H2b is also supported.
Drilling down into the findings on H2a and H2b, we analyze if
participants within the deception group who clicked on the decep-
tive default button perceive even more regret and deception after
being informed about the consequence of their response. Indeed,
our measurements of RE-after are significantly higher for those
who clicked the default button compared to all other participants
in T1 (t(43.962) = −3.82, p < 0.0005). However, no significant dif-
ferences for perceived deception can be found (t(47.73422) = 0.64,
p = 0.64). These two results can be explained by the presence of
smart participants who debunk the default button as deceptive and
do not fall for it. Hence, they have less to regret than those who
only understand the button’s effect after the fact.
To test H3, we investigate the time needed to complete the
consent dialogs. The measurement starts when the cookie banner
appears and ends when the participant clicks a button. This measure
reflects the effort required for responding to the banner. As shown
in Figure 5, participants in the group with reduced choice spent
on average five seconds less on their response than those who
were presented with three purposes. The difference in medians
shows the same trend, albeit less pronounced due to the skewed
distribution. We choose non-parametric statistics to account for this
fact. When only comparing the deception and reduced choice group,
the KW-test reveals that the difference (χ2(1) = 8.89, p < 0.005)
is highly significant, which supports H3. We additionally find a
significant difference between the reduced choice group and the
control group (χ2(1) = 9.73, p < 0.005). The difference between
the deception and control group, which offer the same number of
purposes, is not significant (χ2(1) = 0.17, p = 0.68). The results
indicate that the number of purposes is positively associated with
cognitive load, even if the number of options is way below Miller’s
“magic seven” [34].
Regarding H4, we interpret perceived difficulty (PDI) as a mea-
sure of dissatisfaction. Specifically, we test the difference between
the two treatment groups in order to show whether the number of
purposes in the consent dialog affect the participants’ perceptions.
Since the t-test results in no significant difference (t(95.99) = 0.16,
p = 0.88, d = 0.07), H4 must be rejected.
5.2 Post-hoc Analyses
At the beginning of the questionnaire, we asked participants to re-
call which purposes they have agreed to in the consent banner. Thus,
we are able to compare the accuracy of participants’ statements
between groups. As reported in Table 4, the difference is highly
significant between all three groups (χ2(2) = 11.01 , p < 0.005).
When looking at the proportion of participants who declined
all purposes, it is notable that 50% of the control group, but only
32% of the deception group chose this option. After informing
participants about their choice, we specifically asked those who
agreed to at least one purpose, whether they had been aware of the
Table 4: Overview of results by treatment group.
Group
Dependent
variable T1 T2 Control Test
Number of agreed purposes KW-test
0 32.0% 41.7% 50.0%
1 12.0% 58.3% 19.2%
2 2.0% – 7.7%
3 54.0% – 23.1% ** H1
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Construct means t-test
PDE 3.68 3.74 3.15 * H2b
PDI 2.87 2.90 2.69 n.s. H4
RE-before 2.30 2.64 2.23 n.s.
RE-after 2.69 2.79 2.39 n.s.
PA 3.50 3.70 3.62
– ” – (only subjects who clicked the default button)
(n = 27) (n = 28)
PDI 2.78 2.72
RE-after 3.20 3.48 –
PA 3.32 3.56 –
RE-after minus RE-before paired t-test
0.39 0.15 0.16 ** H2a
Response time for consent dialog (seconds) KW-test
Median 5.36 3.16 7.24 ** H3
Mean 10.95 5.41 11.62
Correct recall of effective purposes χ2-test
73.5% 60.9% 90.0% **
– ” – (only subjects who clicked the default button)
(n = 27) (n = 28)
55.6% 53.6% –
Legend: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, n.s. not significant.
The test results refer to the bold values in the same row.
possibility to decline all purposes. Only 32% stated to be aware of
this option. However, the proportion of aware participants does
not differ significantly between the deception and control group
(χ2(1) = 2.71, p = 0.10). It seems that even the design of our
control dialog, possibly in combination with learned expectations,
imposes some pressure to select at least one option to a subset of
the participants. This highlights that future research could seek to
improve the communication of the “freely given” aspect of GDPR-
compliant consent (cf. Section 2.1).
To test whether users’ privacy attitudes regarding cookies influ-
ence their reaction to the cookie banner, we also test the relationship
between the number of chosen purposes and PA. For this analysis
we only consider the groups that were presented all three purposes.
8
Multiple Purposes, Multiple Problems:
A User Study of Consent Dialogs after GDPR
T1 T2 Control
1
2
3
4
5
Group
Pe
rc
ei
ve
d
de
ce
pt
io
n
Figure 4: Perceived deception (PDE) by treatment. The t-test
shows that PDE is significantly higher in T1 than in the con-
trol group (t(96.82) = 2.24,p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.44).
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Figure 5: Time spent on responding to the consent dialog
by treatment. The KW-test shows a significant difference be-
tween T1 and T2 (χ2(1) = 8.89, p < 0.005).
We find a weak but significant negative correlation between pri-
vacy attitudes and the number of consented purposes (rs = −0.23,
p < 0.05, n = 102). However, the difference in PA between those
who clicked the deceptive button and those who did not, is not
significant (t(91.9) = −1.04, p = 0.30, n = 98). Moreover, as ex-
pected, privacy attitudes do not differ significantly between groups
as participants were randomly assigned to groups. This reassures
us that the PA items measure trait rather than state, and are pretty
robust to question order effects.
6 DISCUSSION
Next we reflect on the results, then discuss limitations (Section 6.2),
and comment on recent developments in the space (Section 6.3).
6.1 Summary and Interpretation
Our experimental results confirm the common conjecture that de-
sign elements of consent dialogs can nudge users towards making
specific choices. We show empirically—to the best of our knowledge
for the first time—that the selection of data processing purposes,
as required by the GDPR, is not exempt: users agree to more data
collection purposes when consent dialogs integrate a highlighted
default button that selects all purposes at once. Surprisingly, we
observe a four times stronger effect for our multi-purpose consent
dialog than previously reported for simple default buttons in binary
consent dialogs. Moreover, the fact that users who click this button
are less likely to correctly recall the consented purposes casts doubt
on the morality and legitimacy of this design element, as it might
lead users to act against their intention. This interpretation is fur-
ther supported by the finding that users tend regret their decision
after being informed about the effective purposes.
Besides the effect of deceptive default buttons (which primarily
merited a study because we encountered them on popular websites),
we present more encouraging results on the possibility to differen-
tiate between consent decision for multiple purposes in one dialog:
although the number of purposes significantly affects the response
time, the difference in perceived difficulty are insignificant. This
indicates that most users can handle three different purposes with-
out experiencing the negative effects predicted by the theory of
choice proliferation. Of course, further studies are needed to inves-
tigate more closely the critical number of purposes. Also the choice
structure, the other relevant determinant in choice proliferation,
requires further attention [29].
Our analysis of control variables reveals that users with stronger
stated privacy attitudes agree to fewer purposes. While this re-
sult seems to challenge the privacy paradox (a term for the often
observed discrepancy between stated attitudes and privacy behav-
ior [22, 37, 48]), it must be interpreted with caution. First, our
instrument is not ideal to study the paradox. It confounds this re-
lationship with the dominant effect of a deceptive default button
and measures the privacy attitude only after recalling the effective
purposes. Second, unlike in many studies that find the paradox,
our items measure privacy attitudes quite narrowly for the specific
domain: two out of three items mention cookies. According to the
principle of compatibility, behavior is more predictable from atti-
tudes if it is measured on the same level of specificity [2]. To some
extent, this corroborates nuanced or critical perspectives on the
privacy paradox [16].
6.2 Robustness and Limitations
To check for possible risks to external validity, we analyzed the
participants’ free-text responses for prejudiced assumptions about
our study. Only one participant exhibited demand characteristics.
The person wrote that he or she has agreed to all purposes because
the website was part of a scientific experiment. All remaining par-
ticipants answered as if they were dealing with an actual flight
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Figure 6: Consent dialog by a commercial consent manager.
search website. Moreover, we do not find further indications that
the participants might have perceived our stimuli as artificial.
It is important to mention that the study has limitations. First,
the experimental setup may not fully reflect users’ actual behavior
regarding consent dialogs. Even though we made an effort to hide
the research purpose of our study, we cannot rule out that partici-
pants might have guessed our focus on cookie banners or privacy
in general. Moreover, our sample is limited to German-speaking
computer science students who are probably more educated about
the functionality of cookies and the web in general. This bias, how-
ever, does not compromise the upshot of this working paper: if
even computer literate populations fall for the deceptive design, we
must assume that the outcome for the general public is even worse.
6.3 Recent Developments
A simple interface adjustment—meanwhile implemented in the
airline website—is to change the button text from “Select all and
confirm” to “Select and confirm” (and change the behavior accord-
ingly) as soon as the first checkbox is selected. While this breaks
with the design principle that button semantics should not be state-
ful, it might avoid the severest mishaps where cognitive effort that
went into selecting purposes is wasted. It requires another user
study with many more participants to gauge if this modification
reduces the disappointment in the subset of users who select at
least one but not all purposes.
In the past months, we have observed other “innovative” consent
dialogs, such as page-long lists of affiliate partners for third-party
tracking, that call for tailored user studies through the lenses of
deception and choice proliferation. For example, a popular meeting
scheduling service uses a modal banner entitled “We value your
privacy” with a prominent button labeled “I accept.” To access
literally hundreds of options, one has to click on “Show purposes”,
which is a text link next to three others (see Fig. 6). Interestingly,
this dialog seems to be operated (and presumably evaluated) by an
intermediary specialized on consent management. This fits into the
picturewhere ENISA, a EU agency, mentions “consentmanagement”
as a new business opportunity for cybersecurity startups [21, p. 10].
7 CONCLUSION
This study presents new empirical evidence supporting that de-
sign elements used in consent dialogs of popular websites might
deceive users into agreeing to more data processing purposes than
intended. It complements recent measurement studies [15, 50, 52]
that emphasize the wide adoption of such “dark patterns” [10]. The
findings suggest recommendations for interface design and policy.
Our first recommendation sounds like a commonplace: instead
of nudging users towards agreements that mainly benefit the party
who owns and controls the website, web designers should offer
default settings that reflect a more privacy-aware choice by eliciting
the majority’s preferences. This could be achieved by designing
a set of best-practice consent dialogs, incorporating the body of
knowledge from behavioral privacy research. These templates can
be made available to organizations who value consumers’ privacy
or seek legal certainty without commissioning an intermediary.
However, past and ongoing efforts in the usable privacy research
community towards understanding how to nudge users into making
safer choices are void if the industry tries to achieve the opposite.
Since the value of personal data increases with the number of possi-
ble secondary uses [47], businesses have incentives to maximize the
number of consented purposes. It is tempting to call for a regulator
or oversight body to step in and ensure that dialogs are designed
in the users’ interest. But we are hesitant about suggesting more
(or more specific) regulations for two reasons. First, the GDPR stip-
ulates freely given, unambiguous, and informed consent. Maybe it
takes a court decision, supported with empirical data collected on a
more systematic basis, to provide clarity over the fact that the prac-
tices we observe do not meet these requirements and hence cannot
provide a legal basis for personal data processing. Second, the time
and cognitive effort millions of users regularly spend on consent
dialogs may not be worth its outcome at the societal level. Rather
than mandating special forms of consent dialogs (which hardly
work for devices without display or network services that are not
customer-facing), a policy priority should be the establishment of a
standard for non-interactive privacy preference negotiations.
It seems that P3P [13] was 20 years ahead of its time, and the
do-not-track header too simple and polarized [38]. It is time to agree
on a middle ground. Consent dialogs would not disappear, but their
design moves from the hands of data controllers to developers of
user agents, who offer a more consistent user experience and can
compete for the best service in the data subject’s interest. In order to
foster competition, and not to repeat the mistakes of do-not-track,
it is important that browser and app vendors should be required to
interoperate with any privacy agent of the user’s choice.
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8 APPENDIX
Table 5: Constructs and corresponding items as used in the
survey.
Item Item text (German)
Perceived Deception (PDE)
PDE1 Die Seite ist bezüglich der Cookie-Einstellungen
unehrlich gegenüber ihren Nutzern.
PDE2 Die Seite versucht Nutzer dazu zu führen, Cookie-
Einstellungen zu wählen, die sie nicht wählen
wollen.
PDE3 Die Seite benutzt irreführende Taktiken, damit
Nutzer Cookie-Einstellungen wählen, die sie nicht
wählen wollen.
Perceived Difficulty (PDI)
PDI1 Es war unverständlich, eine Auswahl zu treffen.
PDI2 Es war frustrierend, eine Auswahl zu treffen.
PDI3↔ Es war einfach, eine Auswahl zu treffen.
Regret (RE)
RE1 Ich bereue meine getroffene Auswahl.
RE2 Ich würde meine Auswahl ändern, wenn ich die
Möglichkeit hätte.
RE3↔ Ich bin mit meiner Auswahl zufrieden.
Privacy Attitudes (PA)
PA1 Der Schutz meiner Privatsphäre im Internet ist
mir wichtig.
PA2 Wenn Webseiten Cookies verwenden, schränkt
dies meine Privatsphäre ein.
PA3 Ich bin besorgt darüber, dass meine Privatsphäre
durch Cookies vonWebseiten eingeschränkt wird.
The scales of items marked with ‘↔’ were reversed for the analysis.
Figure 7: Functionalmock-upwebsite offering flight search.
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Figure 11: German version of the expanded cookie banner
after clicking on “details”.
Figure 12: Pop-up with questionnaire.
Figure 8: German version of the consent dialog (T1).
Figure 9: German version of the consent dialog (T2).
Figure 10: German version of the consent dialog (control).
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